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NOTES

THE GOING AND COMING RULE
"The cost of the product should bear the blood of the workman." 1
Therein lies the purpose of the Workmen's Compensation Act; to
lift the burden of accident losses from the shoulders of the employee
and place it upon the employer. Yet daily, as the masses of gainfully
employed2 proceed to and from their homes and workshops, they
are subjected to hazards which are not compensable.3 Based on
the doctrine of stare decises an employee must have been injured
while on the employer's premises if his injury was to be compensable.
With this line of demarcation drawn the going and coming rule
evolved. "It was that ordinarily injuries in going to and coming
from work were not compensable, they arose neither out of nor in
' 4
the course of employment.
To understand the reason behind the creation of the "going and
coming" rule, it is necessary to understand the meaning of the
words "in the course of employment." Various attempts have been
made to define this phrase since most compensation acts fail to define
it. An injury or an accident befalls a man "in the course of" his
employment, if it occurs while he is doing what a man so employed
may reasonably do and at a place where he may reasonably be
during that time. 5 "In the course of" is sometimes referred to as
"during" the employment or "while at work" or "while the employment was in progress. '"6
Once an employee began his actual work there could be no
question but that he was "in the course" of his employment. But
suppose he was in the factory and was merely bending over to start
his first operation, or putting on his overalls or merely entering the
front door? What about an injury on the snow and ice on the front
public sidewalk which the employer was supposed to keep shoveled?
Or, still further back, what about an injury when the employee
slipped while hurrying from his home to the shop, in order to get
there on time? His primary purpose was employment; should the
injuries be compensable? The "going and coming" rule said no!
1. Stertz v. Industrial Ins. Comm'n, 91 Wash. 588, 158 Pac. 256 (1916).
2. 1 LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW, § 5.30 (1952, Supp. 1964) (compensation coverage relative to total labor force in 1960 placed at seventy-eight and two tenths
per cent).
3. Plihen v. Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 60 N.D. 465, 235 N.W. 354 (1931).
4. IIOROVITZ, CURRENT TRENDS IN WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, p. 671 (1947).
5. Industrial Indem. Exch. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 26 Cal. 2d 130, 156 P.2d 926
(1945).
6. Fields v. Brown Paper Mill Co., 28 So. 2d 755 (La. 1946); In re Jensen, Jensen
v. Manning & Brown, Inc., 63 Wyo. 88, 178 P.2d 897 (1947).
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Thus it was inevitable that, like all narrow rules read into
workmen's compensation acts, many exceptions would develop.
Currently, injuries occurring to an employee while going to or coming
from work are compensable under the North Dakota Workmen's
Compensation Act if they fall within the following restrictive circumstances: when (1) traveling itself is part of the job; (2) the
employer furnishes the transportation to or from work; (3) t h e
employee is subject to emergency calls; (4) the employee is doing,
while traveling, something incidental to his employment; (5) and
7
the employee is injured while proceeding on employer's premises.
This article is concerned primarily with the question of liability
under compensation acts for injuries sustained by an employee
when he is not on the premises of his employer. Due to the complexity
of the questions involved this discussion must be limited to those
exceptions recognized in North Dakota and some of the more widely
accepted trends in other jurisdictions.
THE EXCEPTIONS

An injury may be compensable, although incurred while off the
premises of the employer, if:
(a) The Traveling Itself is Part of the Job
The underlying theory for this exception is that the journey itself
is part of the service to the employer.8 Among the decisions so
holding a New York case, Carney v. Senak New York Corp.,9 is an
excellent illustration. In this suit the deceased, who worked as a
policeman on the 4 p.m. to midnight shift, and at other times as an
outside salesman operating out of his home, was fatally injured at
3:30 a.m. while driving home in his automobile. The court decided
to award death benefits against the employer who employed him as
a salesman, giving as a reason that outside salesmen, working out
of their homes in no fixed location, are usually covered by workmen's
compensation from the time they leave home until they return.
Whether or not the deceased was performing business errands
immediately prior to the accident appears to have had little bearing.
Under most circumstances an employee who is required to travel
as a part of his business duties, but then deviates from his business
route, is not eligible for compensation under this exception. In
Erickson v. Erickson & Co., 10 an architect, while on a business trip,
sustained injuries when he proceeded beyond his destination to pick
7. Fink v. Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 68 N.D. 531. 282 N.W. 505 (1938).
8. Stasel v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 278 S.W.2d 721 (Ky. 1955);
King v. State Indus. Acc. Comm'n, 211 Ore. 40, 309 P.2d 159 (1957) ; Keim v. Burkholder & Johnson, 182 Pa. 460, 127 A.2d 752 (1956).
9. Carney v. Senak New York Corp., 17 App. Div. 2d 170, 233 N.Y.S.2d 316 (1962).
10. Erickson v. Erickson & Co., 212 Minn, 119,
N.W.2d 824 (1942).
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up guests whom he planned to take back to his home. The journey
was held personal and therefore not compensable. The traveling
at the time of injury was taking him further and further from his
business destination. Such cases are clearly identifiable as deviations from business routes for personal side trips and thus beyond
the course of employment. When the employee however, has completed a personal side trip and is once again on the assigned business
route, the courts will find injuries compensable. 11
Some questions arise when the employee who has deviated,
completes his personal mission and is injured while returning to
the business route. The majority deny compensation under these
circumstances,' 1 2 as in the case where the decedent's duties involved
driving cars between the main garage and a subsidiary storage
garage. On the fatal occasion he had gone past the storage garage
to his home and was killed at a railroad crossing while returning
to the business route. 3 The theory here is that such a side trip is
a personal deviation until completed (actual resumption of the
business route).
The minority decisions which award compensation, usually do
not involve clear cut cases of personal side trips and allow compensation on the ground that the employee's only purpose is to attain
4
his employment destination.
(b) The Transportationis Furnishedor Paid for by the Employer
If injuries are sustained by a workman, while he is being conveyed to or from his work, by a means provided for by the employer,
they are compensable pursuant to either an implied or expressed
contractual obligation. 5 There is disagreement, however, with the
"contract" theory as a basis for liability; courts indicate that the
true reason is that the employer has "control" of the transportation. 6
The justification for this holding is that the employer has himself
expanded the range of employment and attendant risks and that
the provided transportation must be considered part of the employer's
premises.
Although this exception is generally recognized, the courts have
handed down conflicting decisions when the employer is a public
transportation company. Injuries sustained by employees traveling
11. White v. Morris, 182 Pa. Super. 454, 127 A.2d 748 (1956).
12. Kayser v. Carson Pirie Scott & Co., 203 Minn. 578, 282 N.W. 801 (1938) ; Kinkead
v. Management & Eng'r Corp., 130 S.W.2d 545 (Mo. 1937); Luke v. St. Paul Mercury
Indem. Co., 140 Neb. 557, 300' N.W. 577 (1941) ; Clegg v. Interstate Ins. Co., 130 N.J.L.
307, 32 A.2d 570 (1943).
13. Public Serv. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 395 Ill. 238, 69 N.E.2d 875 (1946).
14. London Guar. & Acc. Co. v. Herndon, 58 S.E.2d 510 (Ga. 1950) ; Sawtell v. Stern
Bros. & Co., 44 S.W.2d 264 (Mo. 1931); 1 L&RsoN, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW, §
19.33 (1952, Supp. 1964).
15. Hunter v. Summerville, 205 Ark. 463, 169 S.W.2d 579 (1943) ; I-L Logging Co. v.
Manufacturers & Wholesalers Indem. Exch., 220 Ore. 277, 273 P.2d 212 (1954) ; Taylor
v. Meeks, 236 S.W.2d 969 (Tenn. 1951).
16. Peski v. Todd & Brown Inc., 158 F.2d 59 (7th Cir. 1946).
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home from work on free passes have been held to be compensable
in New Jersey and California. 1 7 These courts have found no distinction between this type of employer and others. On the other
hand, in New York, compensation was denied an employee riding
on a free subway pass.18 Where compensation has been awarded
the application of the exception may be justified on either the
"contractual" or "control" theories. The question of application,
however, could be raised where city employees have been injured
while walking home along city streets. 9
The question, of whether an employee is covered while departing
from or entering the employer's provided means of transportation,
has arisen in the course of litigation. Should the doctrine extend
that far? Compensation has been denied when street car employees
have been injured while crossing the street in order to avail themselves of a free ride.2 0 There are cases permitting compensation
under similar situations. 2 1 The cases allowing compensation, when
the employee is alighting from the conveyance, have based their
decisions on special agreements which required the employers to
see the employees safely home.2 2 Under what theory benefits can
23
be awarded in these situations is questionable. In an Arkansas case
the court indicated it could extend the free pass principle to include
travel from the employer's gate to the employee's front door.
Usually, when the cost of the transportation is furnished by
the employer the court will give it consideration when a substantial
distance is involved 4 Even if the distance is not great a separate
agreement between the parties may bring it within this exception;
as in the situation where the employee is induced by his employer
to continue employment. Such was the case where the employer
promised to furnish transportation and the employee was injured
while attempting to procure a street car ride after being informed
transportation was not available.2 5 Perhaps the possibility of denying
an award should be kept open when the transportation allowance
is in fact nothing but a small added compensation, with no evidence
that the travel is sufficiently important in itself to be regarded as
2 6
part of the service performed.
17. City & County of San Francisco v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 61 Cal. App. 2d 248,
142 P.2d 760 (1943) ; Micieli v. Erie R.R., 131 N.J. 427, 37 A.2d 123 (1944).
18.
Tallon v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co., 232 N.Y. 410, 134 N.E. 327 (1922).
19.
Caravello v. City of Milwaukee, 194 Wis. 190, 215 N.W. 911 (1927).
20. Delleplani v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 211 Cal. 430, 295 Pac. 826 (1931) ; De Voe v.

New York State Rys., 218 N.Y. 318, 113 N.E. 256 (1916).
21. Ward v. Cardillo, 135 F.2d 260 (D.C. Cir. 1943); Owens v. Southeast Ark. Trans.
Co., 216 Ark. 950, 228 S.W.2d 646 (1950).
22. Sihler v. Lincoln-Alliance Bank & Trust Co., 280. N.Y. 173, 19 N.E.2d 1008 (1939).
23. Owens v. Southeast Ark. Trans. Co., supra note 21.
24. Wilson v. Rowan Drilling Co., 55 N.M. 81, 227 P.2d 365 (1950); In re Jensen,
Jensen v. Manning & Brown, Inc., 63 Wyo. 88, 178 P.2d 897 (1947).
25. Katz v. Katz, 137 Conn. 134, 75 A.2d 57 (1950).
26. Orsinie v. Torrance, 96 Conn. 352, 113 Atil. 924 (1921) ; Taylor v. Taylor Tire Co.,
285 S.W.2d 173 (Ky. 1955).
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Another inherent difficulty with the exception arises when the
employee, being paid for his travel, does not go directly home. This
can be illustrated by the employee who interrupts his homeward
journey for personal reasons and is injured when he later resumes
the trip. 27 The multiplicity of situations may be the reason the
compensation statutes do not attempt to cover going to and from
work.
(c) The Employee is Subject to Call
When an employee is subject to call twenty-four hours a day
and is actually responding to a special call, he is held to be in the
course of his employment.2 8 There would seem to be no valid
distinction between an injury incurred while in route to work, in
directly
response to the special call, and one incurred while 2going
9
home after the purpose of the special call is completed.
The problems under this exception occur when the employee
is injured in an accident while performing some personal business
while awaiting call. Several theories have been suggested by the
courts such as the act must be incidental to his employment; 30
he must remain under the control of the employer; 31 or the act
must have been one a reasonable person would have done under
the same circumstances.3 2 Although the burden of proving the
injury arose out of and in the course of the employment is on the
claimant, 3 3 it has been indicated that the acts of the employee are
immaterial as long as he is subject to call 4 and within reach of his
employer.2 5 An excellent illustration of this rule is found in a case
where a highway electrician, who was on twenty-four hour stand-by
duty requiring him to be available at his home to answer telephone
calls, was injured while performing a purely personal mission in
his employer's vehicle and was out of the area in which he could
be reached. The court denied compensation saying he had made
it impossible to receive calls.3
To include the strictly personal acts of the on call employee
seems to enlarge the meaning of the statute beyond its reasonable
import. Because of the inconveniences and continuous duties involved
in such situations, however, the rule may be considered reasonable
by some.
27.
Dooley v. Smith's Transfer Co., 26 N.J. Misc. 129, 57 A.2d 554 (1948).
28.
Reisinger-Siehler Co. v. Perry, 165 Md. 191, 167 Atl. 51 (1933).
29. Voehi v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of N. Am., 288 U.S. 162 (1933) ; Turner Day & Woolworth Handle Co. v. Pennington, 250 Ky. 433, 63 S.W.2d 490 (1933); Smith v. Industrial
Comm'n of Ohio, 90 Ohio App. 481, 107 N.E.2d 220 (1948).
30.
Loyola Univ. v. Industrial Comm'n, 408 Ill. 139, 96 N.E.2d 509 (1951).
31. Duffy v. Levine, 275 App. Div. 735, 87 N.Y.S.2d 134 (1949).
32. Long v. Hardware Mutual Ins. Co., 137 So. 2d 486 (La. 1962).
33.
London Guar. & Acc. Co. v. Herndon, 58 S.E.2d 510 (Ga. 1950).
34. Duerock v. Acarrequi, 390 P.2d 55 (Idaho 1961).
35.
Bush v. Houston Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 152 So. 2d 377 (La. 1903).

36.

Ibid.
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It would seem that under the statutes many of the cases to
which the subject-to-call principle is applied should not be compensable, unless they could be classed under one of the other
exceptions.
(d) The Act
Employment

Done by

the Employee is Incidental to His

This exception remedies the special problems created when the
traveling employee must, of necessity, engage in purely personal
acts during business trips and suffers an injury thereby. For
example, when he is injured while sleeping, resting, bathing or doing
any of the innumerable things a person may do for his personal
comfort or convenience.
Miller v. F. A. Bartlett Tree Expert Co. 3 7 provides an interesting
example of the application of this exception. Claimant, at the request
of his employer, attended an annual conference held by the employer.
His work, during the day, required him to become especially dirty
and as he was expected to be neat and clean for the evening
conference he retired to his hotel room, and while bathing, slipped
and injured himself. The court held that since claimant's employment demanded his participation in both day and evening sessions
the injury suffered between those sessions arose out of and in the
course of employment.
This phase of the rule has been given two constructions in relation
to acts not in the direct service of the employer. The "indirect
benefit" theory holds that the employee's act must benefit the
employer at least indirectly 38 and the "part of the employment"
theory holds that an act, whether beneficial or not, is a part of the
employment if it is of the general nature of the work or if it is a
particular custom and practice of the occupation.3 9 The "indirect
benefit" theory requirement leads to employer responsibility for
almost all acts in which an employee may indulge, since any act
which satisfies the employee may be said to incidentally benefit
the employer.4 0 The "part of the employment" theory is equally
unsatisfactory if these personal acts are placed within the protection
of the statute regardless of when or where they take place. The
result could be unlimited employer liability in contravention of the
purpose of workmen's compensation statutes which are not designed
37. Miller v. Bartlett Tree Expert Co., 3 N.Y.2d 654, 148 N.E.2d 296 (1958).
38. De Sautel v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 72 N.D. 35, 4 N.W.2d
581 (1942).
39. Thiede v. Searle & Co., 278 Mich. 108, 270 N.W. 234 (1936).
40. Carried to its logical extreme, when an employee watches television, eats or
sleeps while at home, these acts may by said to be incidentally' beneficial to the employer.
But see Davis v. Newsweek Magazine, 305 N.Y. 20, 110 N.E.2d 406 (1953). A swim In
the ocean for employee's benefit and enjoyment, although it may possibly benefit the
employer in a remote sense; held not in the course of employment of a traveling editor.
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provide accident and health insurance. 4 1 If either of these theories
to be a satisfactory criterion in determining whether an employee
"in the course of" employment, it must be limited so that there
some work connection.
(e) The Employee is Injured on the Premises

Since the course of employment is not confined to the actual
manipulation of the tools of the trade, at what point after the
employee reaches the employer's premises, but before the actual
work commences, should the benefits of workmen's compensation
be available to him? Injuries sustained by an employee, while going
to or from his place of work, upon the premises owned or controlled
by his employer, are generally deemed to have occurred in the
2
course of employment.4
The cases which pose the greatest amount of difficulty under
this exception, are those which attempt to expand the employer's
premises. The courts hold, that if the injury occurs after the
employee has left the premises of his employer and reached a public
highway, any injury which he might receive as a result of an
accident, that is common to the general traveling public, is not
received in the course of employment. 3 Various attempts have
been made to broaden the concept of premises, especially where
the injury occurs just outside the boundary. 4 One of the best available discussions on both sides of this problem may be found in
Barnet v. Britling Cafeteria Co., which by a four to three division,
affirmed an award of compensation to a claimant who slipped on
the ice on the public sidewalk in front of the employer's place of
business, just as she was about to enter.
The majority said that the sidewalk in front of the premises
was equivalent to part of the premises since it was essential to the
employer's business as an avenue of entrance. The court indicated
that the zone of danger is a material element for consideration
because:
A workman might be on the premises of one other than
his employer, or in a public place, and yet be so close to
the scene of his labor, within its zone, *environments and
hazards as to be, in5 effect, at the place and under the
protection of the act.4
41. It is not the purpose of the workmen's compensation acts to substitute accident
and health insurance. Muchmore v. Industrial Comm'n of Ariz., 81 Ariz. 345, 306 P.2d 272
(1957).
42. Bountiful Brick Co. v. Giles, 276 U.S. 154 (1928).
43. Miracle v. Harlan Wallins Coal Corp., 311 Ky. 169, 223 S.W.2d 738 (1949).
44. Papineau v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 45 Cal. App. 181, 187 Pac. 108 (1919), (where
the injury occured in a passageway); In re Sundine, 218 Mass. 1, 105 N.E. 433 (1914),
(where the injury occured on a common stairs).
45. Barnett v. Britling Cafeteria Co., 225 Ala. 462, 143 So. 813 (1932).
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Since the weight of modern authority permits a very broad
definition of premises it seems only natural that the extension
would be made to reach parking lots,46 public roads 4 7 and, as in a

Wisconsin case,' the intersection of a railroad and a public highway,
giving as a reason the fact that the roadway was recognized as the
proper way for employees to approach and leave the premises.
MULTIPLICITY

OF

EXCEPTIONS AND

EROSION

OF THE

RULE

The exceptions have multiplied from year to year, as court
upon court,- believing the general rule to be unfair and artificial,
has sought to ameliorate it by excepting cases which have appealed
to it as coming within the spirit of the workmen's compensation

acts.
The cases have caused the expansion of the original exceptions
to the point of actual erosion of the rule. With judicial determinations
have come additional and even wider exceptions. 49 Manifestly, the
numerous exceptions have swallowed up the rule and when that
occurs must the rule be abolished? As was said by Justice Lummus
in Carter v. Yardly and Co.:
Almost as soon as that asserted general rule had been laid
down requirements of justice in particular cases impelled
the courts to make exceptions. . . . The time has come for
us to recognize that that asserted general rule no longer
exists. In principle it was unsound. It tended to produce
unjust results . . . . We now abandon it in this commonwealth. 50
46.
McIvor v. Savage, 220 Cal. App. 128, 33 Cal. Rept. 740 (1963).
47.
Ganassi v. Pittsburgh Coal Co., 162 Pa. Super. 289, 57 A.2d 717 (1948).
48.
Northwestern Puel Co. v. Swanson, 197
Vis. 48, 221 N.W. 396 (1928).
49.
Compensation has been allowed under the following circumstances: Where employees have been injured en route to or from work in vehicles, public and private, including
car pools sanctioned by the employer, even though the use of this transportation was not
ordered, Wilson v. Rowan Drilling Co., 55 N.M. 81, 227 P.2d 365 (1950); Where the
injuries were sustained by employees who were subject to call at all hours or at the
moment of the injury, Souza's Case, 316 Mass. 332, 55 N.E.2d 611 (1944); Where one
has been injured while traveling as part of his employment, Olson Drilling Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 386 Ill, 402, 54 N.E.2d 452 (1944); Where the employee has been injured
while on a special errand, Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. Bond, 199 S.W.2d 293 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1946) ; Where a salaried employee was injured on his way to do further work
at home or having started work at home is injured en route to his office to continue his
work, Lang v. Board of Educ., 70 S.D. 343, 17 N.W.2d 695 (1945); Where an employee
who was required to bring his auto to the place of business was injured while driving
to or from the employment premises, Davis v. Bjorenson, 229 Iowa 7, 293 N.W. 829
(1940) ; Where special hazards on the employee's normal route cause his Injury, Kuharskl
v. Bristol Brass Corp., 132 Conn. 563, 46 A.2d 11 (1946) ; Where the injury was sustained
by the employee on sidewalks adjacent to or near the employment premises, Gullo v.
American Lead Pencil Co., 118 N.J.L. 445. 193 Atl. 804 (1937); Where the employee was
injured by hazards of the employment which extended beyond the premises, Freire v. Matson Nay. Co., 19 Cal. 2d 8, 118 P.2d 809 (1941) ; Where the entire road system from the
employee's home to the premises of his employment is considered within the area of compensability, Warren's Case, 97 N.E.2d 184 (Mass. 1951).
50.
Carter v. Yardley & Co., 319 Mass. 92, 64 N.E.2d 693 (1946). This case Overruled
the Massachusettes cases denying the manufacturer's liability. 1 LARSON, WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION LAW, § 15.11, p. 195, § 18.32, p. 256 (1952, Supp. 1964). Larson admits that
It Is an artificial rule and adds, "If the going and coming rule is about to be subjected
to a process of gradual erosion, through the device of finding some tidbit of work performed at home, in fairness to employees generally the entire doctrine should be scrapped
and a fresh start should be made in which all goings and comings are covered". 14
NACCA L.J. 394, 400 (1954). This article concluded that: "There is a great opportunity
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Should North Dakota follow the example of Massachusetts or
should the courts adhere to the rule, only allowing compensation
to an employee injured while going to or coming from work if he
comes within the five exceptions presently recognized in this jurisdiction? 51

Many recent decisions have avoided the strict application of the
going and coming rule,5 2 thus indicating that the special exceptions
have appealed to the consciences of judges. Does this determine,
however, that the general rule has no sound basis in workmen's
compensation acts and is it at variance with the need for the general
security of injured workers in the dangerous world in which we live
today?
Various reasons have been advanced for refusing to compensate
an employee for injuries sustained while traveling to and from work:
(1) The employer exerts no control over the employee's
travel: the employee is free to use any means of
transportation and travel at any hour and to use
any route he wishes, providing he arrives at work
5
on time.

(2)

3

The risks involved in the journey are no greater
than those incurred by anyone traveling for any
4

purpose.5

(3)

Travel to work is too far divorced from the productive process to foist upon the consumer the ultimate
burden of insuring against injuries arising there5
from. 5

for some courageous judge to reconsider the going and coming rule in view of the modes
to thought today. A rule which has developed at least six recognized exceptions since it
was announced in England in 1908, Is evidently, if not moribund, deserving of overhauling
as a whole."
51. Fink v. Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 68 N.D. 531, 282 N.W. 505 (1938).
52. Lane v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 331 P.2d 99 (Cal. 1958) ; United States Cas. Co.
v. Russell, 105 S.E.2d 378 (Ga. 1958); Callihan v. Fireman's Fund Indem. Co., 110 So.
2d 758 (La. 1959); De Pasquale v. John W. Cowper Co., 175 N.Y.S.2d 833 (N.Y. 1958).
53. "In applying the 'going and coming rule' and Its various so-called exceptions certain fundamental principles must be . . . kept in mind. . . . Where transportation to and
from work Is . .
furnished by the employfer . . . and Is under his control, it may fairly
be said that . . . conditions to compensation are satisfied. Where these elements are
lacking, however, and the employees are traveling according to their own arrangements
and by whatever means are conveniently available, the opposite is true." Kobe v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 35 Cal. App. 2d 33, 207 P.2d 849 (1949), rev'd, 35 Cal. 2d 33, 215
P.2d 736 (1950). The court found that the employer had by inference contracted to insure the worker against injuries suffered between home and work; Liberty Mutual Ins.
Co. v. Cardillo, 154 F.2d 529 (D.C. Cir. 1946) rev'd., 330 U.S. 469 (1947). The court conceded that control was a factor in departing from the going and coming rule, but held
that on all the facts, an exception was warranted. In the following cases compensation
was awarded, the court finding an element of control to take the situation out of the
scope of the going and coming rule: Ross v. Sunrise Food Exch., 273 App. Div. 833, 75
N.Y.S.2d 897 (1948) ; Industrial Comm'n v. Murphy, 50 Ohio 148, 197 N.E. 505 (1935).
54.
"[I]nJurles received by the workman In going to or coming from . . . work are not
compensable . . . unless . . . by reason of the employment there was some increased or
additional exposure of the injured person to the kind or character of the hazard or danger
which caused the injury." Dubbert v. Beucus, 96 Ind. App. 390, 185 N.E. 311 (1933). See
Harlan Collieries Co. v. Shell, 239 S.W.2d 923 (Ky. 1951).
55. "[Tlhe spirit of the . ..
law requires that the employee must be actually, about
the furtherance of his master's business when the casualty occurs ....
If one Is proceeding
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If these are the reasons for the going and coming rule, are the
exceptions logical? The rule was essentially an expression of policy
and was invoked to impose what was considered to be a reasonable
limitation on the scope of protection.5 6
If "in the course of" were defined in the compensation acts
as during working hours, and only during that period, then of course
the worker would not be protected going to and from work. Or if
it expressly limited its protection only to injuries while on the
premises, the courts would not have to strain their mental resources to determine whether the case came within the general
rule or one of the exceptions.
CONCLUSION

It would appear that the North Dakota courts have gone farther
in giving a liberal interpretation to the Workmen's Compensation
statute and in carrying out its humanitarian purposes than other
jurisdictions upon similar facts. In DeSautel v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau,57 a ward attendant, in an institution
for the feebleminded, had fixed hours of work which extended from
6 a.m. to 7:15 p.m., and which included, in addition to two rest
periods, a fixed lunch hour from 12:30 to 1: 00. It was "understood,"
according to the majority opinion, that she would take her lunch at
her home, which was just across the highway and about one hundred
feet away. But, the dissent points out that she could lunch where
she pleased and that the employer had no control over the place
chosen. While walking toward her home, on her own premises and
on her way to lunch, she fell and was injured. On these facts,
compensation was awarded. Under this generalization, it is apparent
that all lunch hours, under all circumstances, would be gathered
within the protecting arms of the compensation act. It is doubtful
that this was the intention of the drafters of the North Dakota
Workmen's Compensation Act. It would appear that the purpose
of the Act was to lift the burden of accident losses from the shoulders
of the employee and place them upon the employer. But, how much
of a burden should the employer be required to carry? It was
inevitable that exceptions would be established by the courts that
to his home for needed rest and refreshment, can he be regarded as engaged in the
furtherance of the affairs of his employer?" American Indemnity Co. v. Dinkins, 211 S.W.
949 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919) ; See Richtarik v. Bors, 142 Neb. 226, 5 N.W.2d 199 (1942).
56. In 1914, Hills v. Blair, 182 Mich. 20, 148 N.W. 243 (1914), held that an injury
sustained during ordinary travel to and from work did not arise 'out of and in the
course of' employment, as required for compensation by the 1912 Michigan Workmen's
Compensation Act, Mich. Pub. Acts Ex. Sess., No. 10. The "grandfather" California going
and coming case is Ocean Ace. & Guar. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 173 Cal. 313, 159
Pac. 1041 (1916). It was held, just three years after passage of the California Workmen s Compensation Act, California Stat. 1913, § 12, p. 283, that an injury to an employee was not compensable if sustained while going to or coming from work.
57. De Sautel v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 72 N.D. 35, 4 N.W.2d
581 (1942).
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laid down the general rule, but perhaps, in this age of increased
hazards of transportation, the courts of North Dakota should consider
each case on an individual basis. The expansion of the exceptions
could be disregarded and their decisions based on whether or not
the situation falls within those and only those exceptions recognized
in this jurisdiction at the present.
With the modern trend of ever expanding exceptions, it may be
the duty of the legislature to state which ones, if any, fall within
the true spirit of the law.
HARLAN K. HOLLY

